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Abstract 
 
Objectives: In light of the faster than expected take up of the Community Interest 
Company (CIC) in the UK, this paper revisits findings from a study undertaken in 
2000 on the impact of asset-locks on the longevity, growth and management styles in 
co-operative social enterprises.  
 
Prior Work: The co-operative and employee-ownership movements played a leading 
role in the establishment of Social Enterprise London and the Social Enterprise 
Coalition.  The heritage of the UK co-operative movement, however, differs from its 
continental counterpart in placing a much stronger emphasis on common ownership 
that inhibits the transfer of capital and assets to private interests. 
 
Approach: This paper is both conceptual and empirical.  It examines different worker 
co-operative traditions and develops a meta-theory that explains underlying 
assumptions in different forms of co-operative social enterprise.  Using empirical data 
from 5 common ownership co-operatives and 5 equity-based co-operatives, this 
exploratory study found differences in management style, access to finance and 
growth prospects both within and between the two groups. 
 
Implications: Devolution of management responsibilities was more prevalent in 
co-operatives permitting both individual and collective ownership, as opposed to 
common ownership.  Access to external finance was less problematic for 
organisations where individuals had made investments.  Despite this, it was not 
established that organisations with external equity or loan finance grew quicker or 
faired better over the longer term. 
 
Value: The value of the paper lies both in the development of a meta-theoretical 
framework for differentiating forms of worker co-operative, as well as empirical 
evidence on the impact of asset-locks in the management and development of social 
enterprises.  The study suggests that the CLS version of the CIC, or abandonment of 
the CIC in favour of an appropriately structured CLS or IPS model, may be 
appropriate for social enterprises wishing to grow, but makes little difference in small 
service oriented social enterprises. 
 
Key Words: Social Enterprise, CIC, Co-operatives, Equity, Asset Lock, Common Ownership 
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Introduction 
The original motivation for this study was a debate in an established worker co-operative 
seeking to invest in product development.  Its constitution prevented it from applying for 
loan-funding from a Government scheme even though the scheme included co-operatives as 
a target group.  Fund managers would not loan monies to any organisation unless it was able 
to convert loan repayments into equity capital in cases of default.  In 2008, during the 
delivery of third sector governance seminars at Sheffield Hallam University, a consultant 
claimed that 40 (of 2700) CICs had applied to deregister after experiencing problems with 
their asset lock.  These comments prompted discussion of the original research and led the 
author to read more widely on alternative ownership models for social enterprise.  As a 
result, this paper updates previously published work (Ridley-Duff, 2002) by re-analysing 
findings and conducting further secondary research.   
The next section presents an updated literature on co-operative models of ownership, and 
includes a meta-theoretical framework for understanding different forms of staff controlled 
co-operative social enterprises.  A methodology section outlines the approach used to 
combine findings from the original study with more recent research.  This is followed by a 
section presenting results from both the original study and further desk research.  Discussion 
and conclusions provide insights into the likely success of the CIC as a choice for social 
enterprise development. 
Forms of Co-operative Social Enterprise 
Social enterprises adopting a co-operative, mutual or co-ownership approach change the 
relationship between owners, consumers and workers.  This involves restructuring the 
organisation to erode the distinction between employer and employee, with the goal of 
eliminating wage-labour as the dominant mode of working life (ICA, 2005).  Alternatively, the 
relationship between retailer and consumer is restructured so that consumers and/or 
producers have control over the enterprise and supply chain (Woodin, 2007). 
These practices can be motivated by ideological, empirical or pragmatic considerations.  
Ideological motivations are premised on a moral commitment to fairness at work, often 
underpinned by empirical studies that theorise how ownership combined with effective 
participation improves the double-bottom line (Ellerman, 1990; Whyte and Whyte, 1991; 
Bradley and Taylor, 1992; Oakeshott, 2000; Conyon and Freeman, 2001; Jensen, 2006; 
Erdal, 2008).  Pragmatic motivations, on the other hand, involve the use of co-operative laws 
to obtain legal and social advantages (Paton, 1989).  For example, Howarth’s (2007) study of 
co-operatives in Argentina found that choices were influenced by the rapid communication of 
legal rights within established social networks.  A co-operative’s ability to apply to a local 
court for permission to use idle company equipment for up to two years (to facilitate the 
transfer of assets from bankrupt companies) spurred trade unionists to recommend the 
co-operative form when members were threatened by a business closure. 
In the last decade, model company rules have become available that allow social enterprises 
to separate voting rights and equity, or adopt structures reflecting a range of interests (Spear, 
2001; Brown, 2006).  In the UK, the founders of Democratic Business Ltd fuelled the debate 
about the role of equity with a series of publications between 1996 and 2000 (Major, 1996, 
1998; Major and Boby, 2000).  Their enthusiasm coincided with the publication of 
The Ownership Solution (Gates, 1998) which Brown (2006) has interpreted for the social 
enterprise movement.  In ideological terms, this gave a new impetus for pluralist thinking on 
ownership, governance and management control, igniting fresh debates on the merits of 
stakeholder involvement (Sternberg, 1998; Vinten, 2005) and the form this should take in 
social enterprises (Borzaga & Defourny, 2001; Ridley-Duff, 2007). 
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Historically, perceptions of co-operatives have been negatively influenced by prominent 
figures on both wings of the political divide.  Marx (1984: 440) commented, "they naturally 
reproduce in their actual organisation all the shortcomings of the prevailing [capitalist] 
system" and this encouraged left-wing parties to argue that political activity should 
concentrate on the working class.  Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1914, 1921) also adopted the 
view that co-ops would always suffer from worker-indiscipline and poor management.  
Rothschild and Allen Whitt (1986) not unreasonably criticise the Webbs for failing to support 
their claims with empirical evidence, and when Cornforth et al. (1988) examined the failure 
and survival rates of British co-ops between 1978-1986, they found relatively good 
performance compared to the private sector (compare Paton, 1989; Holmstrom, 1993). 
Spear (1999) charts how the deregulation of public services led to a thaw in trade union 
hostility toward co-operatives and employee-buyouts.  In some cases, they acted more like 
their continental and South American counter-parts by playing a lead role in their creation 
(Patton, 1989; Howarth, 2007).  Deregulation, unfortunately, also provided opportunities for 
careerists and private speculators.  Cook et al. (2002) tracks the legislative changes that 
allowed “carpetbaggers” to cash in on building society demutualisation as well as the 
subsequent period in the 1990s when career-oriented executives benefited from promoting 
the sale of demutualised societies to private banks. 
The UK Context 
It is appropriate to ask ‘why has development in the UK differed significantly from the rest of 
the EU?’  Between 1970 and 1990, the most influential organisation promoting and servicing 
worker co-ops was the Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM)1.  Established in 
1971, model rules were produced in 1976. Over ten years, this triggered the creation of 1176 
co-ops employing 6,900 people - an average of six staff per co-op (Cornforth et al, 1988).  In 
contrast, ten years after the constitution of the Spanish Mondragon co-ops was regularised 
(around 1960), 48 co-ops were created employing 8,570 people (averaging 179 staff).  When 
it is considered that the Mondragon region is just half the size of Wales, the gap in 
achievement is apparent (Oakeshott, 1990).  One common explanation is that members’ 
capital investments finance the co-operatives, while a share of surpluses and welfare 
benefits accrue to individual members.  Unlike co-operatives in the UK which favour 
community over individual ownership, the Mondragon system builds in explicit benefits and 
substantial profit-sharing arrangements that provide for the long-term welfare needs of 
members, their families and the wider community (see Oakeshott, 1990; Whyte and Whyte, 
1991; Turnbull, 1995; Lezamiz, 2003). 
In the UK, although there is no specific company law covering co-ops, ownership structures 
have usually been based on Industrial and Provident Society model rules (IPS).  After 
serving a probationary period, worker-members pay £1 for a share.  When they leave, they 
give up their share.  Not only is external share-ownership prohibited, each member’s share 
cannot accrue in value, and the member cannot gain financially from the sale of business 
assets.  ICOM had a virtual monopoly on registering UK co-ops as common ownerships until 
the late 1980s.  In 1988, the Employee Share Ownership Centre (ESOC) was established.  
By 2000, the ESOC (2000) claimed that 2,000 companies had created employee ownership 
share plans (ESOPs), including 80% of the top 1500 quoted companies.  These involve over 
3 million employees, but they rarely give employees more than a 20% stake.  However, 
several authors have found that the mechanism of the ESOP - an employee benefit trust 
(EBT) that uses the assets of the company to fund share purchases for employees - has 
been used to create a significant number of majority employee-owned businesses that now 
contribute more to GDP than the charity/voluntary or agricultural sector (Spear, 1999; Major 
and Boby, 2000; Knell, 2008). 
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Major (1996, 1998) researched the various problems faced by co-ops and ESOPs in the USA 
and contended that most suffer from ‘equity degeneration’ – a situation where one or more 
stakeholder is unable to realise the full-value of their past efforts, risk-taking, investments 
and decisions.   Expanding a theme propounded by Ellerman (1990), he argued that 
ownership and control were not inextricably linked and that rules with two types of share – 
Voting Shares and Value Added Shares – could effectively separate ownership rights from 
voting rights.  This approach, however, has proved less popular than one promoted by the 
Baxi Partnership and Employee Ownership Association (EOA) (see Erdal, 2008: Chapter 
17).  Based on US-style leveraged employee-buyouts (Rodrick, 2005) with Mondragon-type 
democratic controls, private sector companies and common-ownership co-operatives are 
converted to majority employee-owned companies.  The system uses a profitable track 
record and growing asset base to secure loans that establish an employee-benefit trust 
which can acquire the business (compare Spear, 1999).  Initially, at least 50% (+1) of shares 
are held in the EBT with subsequent annual surpluses distributed through an ESOP to 
individual share accounts.  Providing 50% (+1) remain in trust and there is an embedded 
mechanism issuing new shares to employee accounts, a profitable company cannot be 
acquired by outside investors against the wishes of the trustees (employees). 
This combination of collective and individual ownership has attracted both Sunderland Home 
Care Associates (SHCA) and Eaga Ltd (see www.employeeownership.co.uk).  In 1998, 
SCHA converted from a £1 per member common ownership model to a combined EBT / 
ESOP model.  In 2006, its steady growth and business performance in social care led to 
recognition when they won 'top social enterprise' at the UK's 2006 Enterprising Solutions 
Awards (EOA, 2008). Since 2004, they have replicated the model in three other regions and 
added a further £3.2m to the group’s turnover (Higgins, 2007). 
The various cooperative forms of social enterprise, therefore, can be summarised as shown 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 – Typology of Worker Co-operatives and Employee-Owned 
Businesses 
 Common Ownership 
Workers do not share in the 
assets of the company 
Individual / Collective Ownership 
Workers and stakeholder groups share the 
assets of the company 
Non-Equity Common ownerships.  Limited 
profit distribution in equal 
proportions.  Reserves and 
assets belong to the 
organisation, not members. 
Mondragon style co-ops that provide for 
internal capital accounts that are revalued as 
fixed assets vary in value.   A proportion of 
profit accrues to capital accounts (owned by 
individual members), and interest is paid on 
the full balance each year.  Reserves and 
assets belong to members collectively. 
Equity Common ownerships that allow 
equity that does not rise/fall in 
line with market values.  
Limited profit distribution 
according to equity holdings.  
Reserves and assets belong to 
the organisation, not members. 
EBTs / ESOPs in the UK/US and elsewhere or 
Labour Companies (Sociedad Anonima 
Laboral) in Spain that support majority 
employee-ownership.  Equity rises and falls in 
line with market values with dividends 
allocated shareholders. Share values reflect 
the market worth of the company.  Reserves 
and assets belong to members collectively. 
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Does this imply a link between ownership and management structure, and what impact does 
this have on development?  All worker co-ops have an assembly of workers that (in theory, 
but not always in practice) retains supreme decision-making power (Anon, 2007).  The 
frequency this body meets varies with size.  In the small co-ops, all workers can meet 
weekly: large co-ops may convene only once a year.  Regardless of whether co-ops are 
commonly or individually owned, they frequently develop what Oakeshott (1990:155) has 
called ‘the classic co-operative control structure’.  This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 - Representative Management 
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Suma, in Halifax (England), resisted the tendency towards an elected policy-making body.  In 
the early 1980s, it started experimenting with collective forms that devolved decision-making 
powers to smaller autonomous groups (ICOM, 1989).  Initially, they divided the 
General Meeting into two groups - personnel and finance – a system that evolved into a 
‘doughnut’ model with autonomous groups free to organise day-to-day activities including 
recruitment, scheduling and business development.  By 1988, Suma had grown to more than 
40 so the General Meeting was abandoned in favour of 3 ‘sectors’, each with representatives 
elected to a central co-ordinating body nicknamed the ‘hub’ (Cornforth, 1995).  In the early 
1990s, each sector met weekly to discuss issues facing the business and then took views to 
hub meetings for decision.  Co-ordination was achieved through a business plan, 
departmental budgeting, and an elected position of ‘sector co-ordinator’.   
The significance of Suma’s structure is that policy formation and operational management 
was devolved (close to product and service delivery), while policy decisions were conceded 
to an elected body (see Figure 3).  As a whole, the structure maintained the participative 
character of collectives, rather than the predominantly top-down representative models 
outlined by Oakeshott (1990). This might seem like an isolated diversion but for the fact that 
the doughnut model coincided with Suma’s growth.  By 1993 the structure supported over 60 
staff, and by 2000 over 90 (Warburton, 2000).  By 2004, however, some elements of the 
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‘classic’ model had been re-adopted.  Elected “sector co-ordinators” had been replaced by 
appointed “functional co-ordinators”.  These were described by the hub chair as part-time 
managers accountable through regular member surveys appraising their performance.  The 
balance of their time was allocated to non-managerial warehouse duties to keep them 
connected to practical business issues.  General Meetings were also reintroduced, this time 
enforced by new rules requiring attendance (Cannell, 2004). 
Figure 3 – Suma Doughnut Structure 
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Certainly, it appears that there is a stronger dependency between company rules and access 
to finance than company rules and management practices.  Considering the variety of 
management styles in use, it is reasonable to suggest that growth and viability does not 
depend on conventional business practices, providing solutions encourage high levels of 
participation and formally delegated decision-making powers (compare Paton, 2003).  
Fieldwork, therefore, was designed to explore whether the link between company rules and 
access to finance is a more significant factor in the growth of co-operative social enterprises 
than management structure. 
Research Methodology 
This exploratory study was conducted using telephone interviews.  In 2000, twenty 
organisations were selected by working alphabetically through a directory of co-ops and 
employee-owned businesses (provided by Major, 2000).  All came from London and Home 
Counties (total population 84) to ensure a balanced sample of non-equity and equity co-ops 
from a single geographical location.  Even so, as it was not possible to select all 
organisations from a single industry, each was screened to ensure income was derived from 
“professional services”.  This screened out manufacturing organisations to limit variability. 
With the exception of the researcher’s own company, the size of each was not known 
beforehand.  An attempt was made to obtain data on turnover and expenditure from public 
records but this was not always available.  Obtaining financial data in test interviews proved 
impractical and unreliable so the questionnaire was amended to obtain a verbal assessment 
of turnover and staff changes in the last 5 years. 
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Semi-structured telephone interviews (up to 40 minutes long) were used to collect both 
quantitative and qualitative data from a final sample of 11 companies, with one answering the 
questionnaire by e-mail.  It was subsequently found that two organisations were non-profit 
making: these have been excluded from the results to leave a final sample comprising ten 
service-based “more than profit” co-operative social enterprises from a single region.  There 
were an equal number of non-equity co-ops (prevented by their rules from issuing “ordinary 
shares”) and equity co-ops (offering shares that carry voting rights and dividend 
entitlements). 
The interview focussed on decisions involving significant expenditure.  Each organisation 
was asked to explain how proposals were put forward, the forum(s) in which they were 
discussed, and which person or body had final decision-making authority.  A range of 
qualitative data was collected about trading conditions, special constraints and any triggers 
for expansion and contraction.  To examine long-term outcomes, four companies (two equity-
based, two non-equity) were selected for a follow up investigation in 2008 using public 
(secondary) sources.  In all cases, multiple sources were used to check claims including: 
web-articles; Companies House records; news reports; company web-sites and annual 
reports.  To honour the original commitment to confidentiality, company names and sources 
have been withheld. 
Results 
In 2000, five cases (A – E) were constituted with common ownership rules as Companies 
Limited by Guarantee (CLG).  These issue £1 shares to members upon completion of a 
probationary period.  Members give up the share upon leaving.  The share does not accrue 
in value or entitle the member to the company’s profits or assets (upon liquidation).  Profits 
can be distributed in the form of bonuses.  The other five cases  (F – J) were constituted as 
Companies Limited by Share (CLS).  Two used model ICOM rules that allowed shareholding, 
either through an employee trust or direct investment.  While entitling the shareholder to a 
proportion of profits, shares did not confer ownership rights or accrue in value.  The other 
three businesses used internally devised rules to issue tradable shares.  In these three 
cases, the formal board included members of staff elected by the workforce: participative 
management practices (staff teams) were in operation in all co-ops.  Shares in these 
companies could rise and fall in value.  A summary of the sample is given in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 – Characteristics of Selected Companies 
Company Formed Size  Constitution Comments 
A 1998 7 ICOM, with equity 
shares 
New organisation formed with a core group providing 
advice/consultancy to women’s organisations.  
B 1998 8* Employee-owned 
business 
Created to provide ICT services.  Formed as a spin off 
(acquired staff from branch of a US company).  
C 1988 10 ICOM, with equity 
shares 
[Information on services no longer unavailable].  Formed 
with 20 staff, grew to 36, then slowly shed staff. 
D 1986 50* Employee-owned 
business 
Created to provide ICT /  communication services to 
public and third sector organisations.  Grew rapidly after 
changing to a CLS. 
E 1995 105* Employee-owned 
business 
Company acquired by approximately 30 staff (spin off) 
providing creative design services to all sectors.  Owned 
by employee benefit and profit-sharing trusts. 
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F 1994 3 ICOM, £1 shares Formed with small group of staff to provide design 
services.  Now 3 core staff with additional work 
contracted to freelancers. 
G 1983 9 ICOM, £1 shares Formed by group of consultants to provide management 
advice.  Do not wish to grow “too much”. 
H 1979 10 ICOM, £1 shares Formed by 8 staff wanting ‘freedom from supervision’ by 
providing computer services to public and third sector 
organisations.  
I 1980 15 ICOM, £1 shares Co-operative formed to provide management and agency 
services for performing arts professionals. 
J 1986 16 ICOM, £1 shares Formed to provide training and film editing services.  
Also attempted to create CLS ‘sister companies’. 
Companies A-E are ‘equity’ co-operatives (* indicates variable yield equity); companies F-J 
are common ownership ‘non-equity’ co-operatives.  The following results were published with 
the original study (see Ridley-Duff, 2002).   
Table 1 – Breakdown by Size and Management  
Company Size Managers? Additional Board 
Meetings? 
Comments 
A 7 Yes Yes Have a General Manager.  Board is elected by staff. 
B 8* Yes Yes Structure/Staff inherited, have an MD. 
C 10 No Yes No managers, but do have professional directors. 
D 50* Yes Yes General Meeting abandoned after growth, Board of 
Directors created, with managers and teams. 
E 105* Yes Yes Directors appointed by staff teams.  Board meets to 
approve accounts before AGM.  Elected staff 
welfare organisation. 
F 3 No No 3 core staff, work regularly contracted to 4 freelance 
staff.  Additional freelancers in busy periods. 
G 9 Yes No Work Allocator, Personnel Manager and Finance 
Manager appointed at AGM by consensus. 
H 10 No Yes Management functions distributed amongst 
directors.  Members become directors after 2 years 
I 15 No No Paid staff obtained work for professional members, 
who then pay commissions to the co-operative. 
J 16 Yes Yes Managers appointed by Board.  Board became 
self-selecting after growth. 
All ‘equity’ co-operatives had formally elected boards that discharged functions outside 
member meetings (in two cases, this was only to satisfy formal requirements of company 
law).  In three of the ‘non-equity’ co-operatives, no separate directors meeting took place.  
Another noteworthy difference was a flexible approach by non-equity co-operatives to the 
payment of fees to members.  In three cases, operations oscillated between a quasi-wages 
system and the payment of professional fees.  Co-op I always paid fees to members, while 
co-op H used a similar system in its early years.  In contrast, all ‘employee-owned’ 
organisations operated a payroll for ‘employees’.  One interesting variation of this is case B 
where staff worked the first two months without pay to ‘earn their equity’. 
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Table 2 – Breakdown by Size and Authority to Make Expenditure  
Each organisation was asked whether individuals were authorised to make expenditure to 
determine how much decision-making authority is delegated. 
Company Size Can Individuals Authorise Expenditure? 
A 7 Yes – up to £500 
B 8* Within Approved Budgets 
C 10 Within Approved Budgets 
D 50* In Transition to Departmental Budgeting 
E 105* Within Approved Budgets 
F 3 Minor Items Only 
G 9 Minor Items Only 
H 10 Minor Items Only.  Cheques need one director’s signature up to £500, but group 
approval required before making purchases 
I 15 No 
J 16 Within Approved Budgets – variable individual limits 
There is more evidence of delegation of authority amongst the equity co-ops (A – E).  
Table 3 in the original study (Ridley-Duff, 2002:77) calculated the average age of 
equity-based co-operatives to be 7 years compared to 14 years for common ownerships. The 
average size was 36 in equity co-ops compared to 11 for common ownerships. 
Table 4 – Where are proposals made and discussed? 
The research then asked where proposals for staff recruitment and equipment purchases 
were initiated and discussed. 
Company Size Source of Proposals Comments 
A 7 Management Consensus sought, General Manager keen not to be seen as 
‘manager’. 
B 8* Staff Team MD keen on participative management style and consensus. 
C 10 Directors  
D 50* General 
Meeting/Management 
Managers no longer answerable to General Meeting, just the 
board (which contains staff representatives). 
E 105* Staff/Management 
Team 
Mostly team-based, Directors consulted. 
F 3 General Meeting  
G 9 General Meeting  
H 10 General Meeting  
I 15 General Meeting  
J 16 Management or Board … meetings held with staff every 2 weeks to ‘ensure participative 
management style’. 
It is noteworthy that two equity co-ops (B and E) allowed staff teams to take the lead role in 
the creation and development of proposals.  These cases indicate a different approach to 
organisation compared to other co-ops in the sample. 
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Table 5 – Where are proposals finalised and approved? 
Company Size Final Decisions Comments on Decision Making 
A 7 Management General Manager plays down his ‘manager’ role. 
B 8* Management Consensus always used (never vote); MD must approve. 
C 10 Board Board takes decisions.  Always vote. 
D 50* General 
Meeting/Management 
In transition to a ‘conventional management structure’ due to 
conversion and rapid growth. 
E 105* Management Consensus in team always used (never vote), but relevant 
Director must approve decision. 
F 3 General Meeting Consensus amongst 3 core staff. 
G 9 General Meeting Consensus, occasional voting. 
H 10 General Meeting Consensus, occasional voting. 
I 15 General Meeting [No information]. 
J 16 Management or Board Consensus sought, final decision by board. 
Tables 6 and 7 (Combined) – How is business expansion (staff recruitment) and 
equipment typically financed? 
Discussions then focussed on financing expenditure (Ridley-Duff, 2002: 77-78). 
Company 
Type 
Finance Raised 
Using… 
Staff / 
Expansion 
Equipment Comments 
Equity Cash Reserves/Profit 1 3 (Only 4 responded to staff/expansion).   
 Loan Finance 1 1  
 Equity 2 1 Initial equipment purchases only 
Non-Equity Cash Reserves/Profit 4 4  
 Loan Finance 1 1  
Finally, tables 8 and 9 in the original study (Ridley-Duff, 2002: 80-81) show verbal 
assessments of changes in turnover and staff numbers: these had risen faster in equity 
coops than common ownerships over the previous 5 years.  These assessments were 
checked against background information to see if ‘objective’ data supported the claims. 
Table 10 – Employment Growth 
Type Employment (Whole 
Sample) 
Years Traded (Whole 
Sample) 
Staff Growth (per annum) 
Equity 180 35 5.1 
Non-Equity 53 77 0.6 
Discussions yielded some rich qualitative data.  One non-equity co-op (G) was happy with 
(even proud of) their size and structure and always used cash reserves/profits for 
expenditure.  In the follow up study, company G had grown from 9 to 12 staff: its website 
confirmed that it remains employee owned and controlled.  Two others (F and H) had periods 
where members limited growth aspirations, recognising that growth would bring changes that 
few members wanted.  One (F) preferred to handle busy periods by contracting freelance 
staff, rather than recruiting more members.  
Three co-ops (originally ‘non-equity’) working with new technology experienced problems 
obtaining investment funding (cases D, H and J).  The first (D) converted to a company 
limited by shares (CLS).  The second (J) created ‘private’ sister companies that could receive 
investment.  The third (H) was actively discussing changes to its rules in 2000 to issue 
equity.  By 2008, co-ops D and H had following through plans with variable results.  In D, the 
conversion struggled after a few years: public sources and company documents confirm that 
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there was dissatisfaction with the way private shareholders progressively undermined 
workplace democracy.  In 2001, additional investment from the Baxi Partnership was 
acquired to strengthen employee-ownership but this did not stop an entire department 
leaving in 2002 to create a new co-operative (D1).  Companies House records, however, 
show that by 2006 it was dormant, and that in September 2008 D1 requested voluntary 
liquidation.  Five other members organised a transfer into a consumer co-operative (D2).  
This business traded strongly and reacquired assets taken over by D in 2003.  It grew year 
on year until 2007 when its annual report shows 41 staff and a turnover of £7m.  Dividend 
payments to members are made each year, with matching amounts paid to a ‘social 
economy development fund’.  In contrast, Companies House records show that company D 
was dissolved in 2006. 
This case (D) illustrates that a worker co-operative can lose control to a private trading 
company then can reacquire it in the form of a consumer-cooperative (D2) through social 
action.  Clearly, from the timing of events, this was not an entirely hostile endeavour.  
Company D’s website shows a degree of consent in the transfer of assets to companies D1 
and D2.  Nevertheless, this is a far cry from what was envisaged in 2000.  It represents a 
case that lends support to the argument that democratic ‘degeneration’ (Michels, 1961) can 
be reversed by democratic ‘renewal’ (Cornforth, 1995). 
Non-equity co-ops (cases F and H) had been unable to obtain loans or overdrafts without 
personal guarantees.  Equity co-ops (C, and the spin-off enterprise from H) found it much 
easier to obtain bank loans at low rates of interest after members made personal 
investments.  However, there was one notable exception: co-op (E) had rules that prevented 
the issue of external equity and did not require up-front investment from members (having 
used an EBT / ESOP to acquire control).  The bank was unhappy and made a loan 
application conditional on giving personal guarantees.  It made clear that it disapproved of 
plans to issue equity to all staff, and formally advised distributing shares only to managers 
(the same advice was given to H1 during its spin-off).  Co-op E decided against the bank 
loan and, within 5 years, traded its way out of debt, tripling staff numbers (to 105) and 
increasing profits ten-fold.  Its longer-term fortunes, however, were more variable.  Press 
reports indicate a problem that triggered the departure of 5 senior staff in 2002.  Staff 
numbers quickly halved (to 50) and the founder also departed.  Nevertheless, co-op E 
stabilised: press reports claim it had 55 staff in 2008, and the company’s website claims staff 
still have equal shares.  The governing body comprises a 5-person ‘council’ including two 
non-management staff elected by the workforce. 
In extreme cases, members of non-equity co-ops felt trapped by their rules and expended 
considerable energy trying to work around them.  Co-op J, for example, created a private 
limited company to prevent losing a customer that wished to invest in J’s development.  
Later, this created new problems when auditors sought to prevent the transfer of assets 
(resulting in a rental arrangement for equipment). In another case (H), the non-equity co-
operative created a second employee-owned business (H1) that had both internal and 
external shareholders while retaining a system of one-member one-vote on policy decisions.  
Although company (H1) later ceased trading, the original worker cooperative (H) survived 
and still trades.  In 2007, however, the founder (approaching retirement) wrote to former 
members to announce plans to wind it up. 
In contrast to these mixed experiences, the MD of one equity co-operative (B) recounted 
experiences working in the US.  Equity was available to all staff but paid no dividend.  Re-
investment was as high as possible with the aim of building the company (and its share 
value).  In 7 years, shares increased from $10 to $135, and the business had a $5 billion 
turnover.  For reasons that were not explained, the company was sold off (and run down) so 
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he chose to sell his shares and invest £50,000 in a new UK-based employee-owned co-
operative.  Within two years it had eight staff and a turnover above £2 million. 
The stronger employment performance of the equity co-ops that did not have common 
ownership rules should be noted here.  The table below was included in the original study to 
show the employee-owned co-ops in a category of their own. 
Table 11 – Employment Growth 
Type Sub-Type Employment  
(Whole Sample) 
Years Traded 
(Whole Sample) 
Growth 
(Staff/ 
annum) 
Average 
Size 
Equity Employee-Owned 
Business 
163 21 7.8 54 
 Common Ownership 17 14 1.2 9 
Non-Equity Common Ownership 53 77 0.6 11 
This performance needs to be contextualized, however, with a cautionary note about drawing 
conclusions from such a small sample.  Two of the employee-owned businesses inherited a 
favourable business environment, taking over existing customer-bases.  In subsequent 
years, their performance was more variable so their growth potential is overstated (even if 
still relatively strong).  
Discussion 
How reliable is the data?  We need to take into account several factors.  Firstly, all the 
interviewees were senior staff and some were founder members.  Their aspirations and 
values - typically to run businesses democratically - may have projected a more idealised 
picture of their workplace than would have been the case if, for example, new staff had been 
interviewed (see Ridley-Duff, 2005).  Secondly, a major limitation is that only one person 
from each organisation was interviewed.  However, the researcher found all the interviewees 
offered comments freely and never got the impression that relevant information was being 
withheld or distorted.  Given the subject of the research, it was necessary to talk in the first 
instance to staff that had an understanding of the company’s constitution, structure, 
decision-making process and financial performance.  With regard to sample size, increasing 
it would have introduced more variables into the study (different locations, business types2), 
which would have reduced the ability to examine the impact of company rules specifically.  
There is one immediate question regarding the ‘outlier’ cases (case D with 50 staff, and Case 
E with 105).  Should these be excluded?  Given their history, the answer is definitely ‘no’.  In 
case D, the organisation struggled to grow beyond 15-20 staff when using ICOM / CLG rules.  
To move beyond this size, and secure investment, a corporate structure was created using 
an EBT, a new trading company and a private sector partner.  The switch to tradable equity, 
therefore, was considered a necessary step to re-capitalise the business.  In case E, the 
original spin off company had only 30 staff (smaller than at least one of the ICOM 
companies, which grew to 36 staff before shrinking back to 10).  In this case, the growth was 
attributed to the company design based on an EBT and profit-sharing trust which provided a 
powerful incentive for increased productivity and profitability.  Without this, individuals could 
not acquire individual shareholdings in the new company and provide for their long-term 
future security.  Their size, therefore, is attributable – at least in part – to the company rules 
selected, not just the management style adopted. 
Nevertheless, the following analysis should be approached with caution: results are 
suggestive, not conclusive. 
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Rules and Management Structure 
Tables 2, 4 and 5 gave clues to the different approaches taken to management.  Table 2 
shows that all equity co-ops delegate authority to make expenditure, and most use annual 
budgeting as an aid to authorising as well as controlling expenditure.  In contrast only one 
(the largest) non-equity co-operative used a similar approach, with the rest requiring group 
approval for almost all expenditure.  
Tables 4 and 5 summarised the main attributes of proposal making and decision-making.  
Two of the fastest growing businesses (both employee-owned businesses) typically initiated 
proposals at the lowest level – the staff-team - and only required approval of one other 
person (a director or senior manager).  All the equity co-ops based on common ownership 
rules had a formal management body (a General Council / Meeting) that needed to reach its 
own consensus.  While this could be a function of size, even the smallest equity co-ops used 
a formally recognised manager while common ownerships twice their size did not. 
Is there a link between these approaches and business development?  The data suggests 
there is, but it is difficult to draw a direct relationship between the two.  Some common 
ownerships (cases G and H) had a cautious approach to growth, but this did not hold across 
the sample.  It is worth recalling Suma’s management structure here.  Its defining 
characteristic (for a period in the 1990s) was devolved proposal-making and operational 
responsibility with final approval sought from (an elected) management.  What we can say 
with certainty is that there is a qualitative difference between the approach to 
decision-making in the businesses that have grown larger (including Suma).  The focus is on 
experienced staff nurturing good proposals (and screening out bad ones) usually initiated at 
team level.  As Suma is itself based on common ownership rules (ICOM, 1987, Appendix 1), 
it cannot be said that common ownership necessarily results in a top-heavy management 
system.  The higher incidence of centralised proposal- and decision-making in the common 
ownerships, however, does suggest that the rules encourage this. 
Given the objective of participation and democratic decision-making in most (if not all) of 
these businesses, these findings question whether General Meetings actually produce the 
levels of participation and self-governance that is desired.  The evidence, supported in the 
literature on mentoring and coaching, indicates that devolved decision-making driven by 
individuals in staff-teams, guided by experienced leaders, is a more effective way to secure 
active participation in organisation development (Clutterbuck & Megginson, 2005). 
Rules and Access to Finance 
It was suggested earlier that the link between company rules, access to finance and growth 
may be a strong one.  Table 10 shows that equity-based co-ops took on an average of 5 staff 
a year, nearly 10 times the rate of non-equity co-ops.  After follow up research, it is clear the 
difference is overstated but still substantial.  Other evidence is now available.  Firstly, the 
cases of Sunderland Care Home Associates and Eaga Ltd (www.employeeownership.co.uk) 
provide further evidence of rapid growth after a switch away from common ownership to an 
EBT/ESOP model.  Further evidence comes from a study of 300 companies by Conyon and 
Freeman (2001) that was not available in 2000.  This study found a 20% productively 
improvement in private sector organisations that combined employee-ownership and 
participative management, compared to ownership or participation alone.  Lastly, there is the 
evidence presented to the All Party Parliamentary Group for Employee Ownership indicating 
a broadening of employee-ownership sector.  None of the sample chose the reverse route 
(changing from a CLS to a CLG) for any reason, although case (D) split off from a CLS to 
form a consumer co-operative based on the IPS model revised in 2002.  In only two cases 
(F and G) was a CLG considered desirable as a long-term organisational form.  In the other 
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three cases, the CLG was considered an obstacle to growth whether desired (as in case H) 
or the result of market pressures (as in case J). 
However, it is by no means clear that external equity is either necessary or advantageous.  
While there are examples of companies in the sample growing rapidly as a result of 
converting or creating companies to receive external investment, the most remarkable 
growth is in an EBT/ESOP that issued only internal equity.  This mirrors the case of SHCA, 
and lends support to Cornforth et al. (1988) who found that building the strength of internal 
revenue streams can be more effective than seeking external investment.  However, tables 6 
and 7 suggest that, while companies of both types prefer to use cash reserves and profits to 
fund equipment expenditure, equity is useful to fund expansion if legal mechanisms ensure 
that the social structure of the company can be protected.  With the follow up research, it is 
clear that external funding brings significant risks.  However, where this is organised through 
establishment of an EBT / ESOP rather than an external shareholding, the signs are that it 
provides a more stable transition to employee-ownership. 
Can we generalise from these conclusions?  The answer is a heavily qualified “Yes”.  The 
sample, while including some variability and being fairly small, was sufficiently well controlled 
to suggest further directions for research.  We can, with some certainty, say that company 
rules do not directly influence management structure, but do encourage certain structures 
(particularly in the start up years).  In saying this, it should be remembered that one 
non-equity co-op ignored its rules on voting rights, introduced a self-selecting board and fairly 
rigid top-down management (case J).  Other companies that provided for voting according to 
share-allocation never voted on anything (cases A, B and E), adopting a consensus 
approach in all decision-making.  Management style and structure is a matter of choice, 
whether the rules seek to influence them or not. 
Finance is a different matter.  The possibilities open to a business are intrinsically linked to 
both the company’s own rules and the legal environment in which they operate.  The 
evidence suggests that restrictions on the issue of equity have the potential to harm 
organisational development.  This being the case, the choice of a CIC registered as a CLG is 
unlikely to be the optimum choice for social enterprises that wish to grow.  While the 
evidence was inconclusive about whether external equity is necessary, the study suggests 
that equity in any form can help businesses develop faster because it encourages a creative 
attitude towards efficiencies as well as new options for collaborations and partnerships.  
If growth is not desired, or the organisation delivers services that do not require large 
investments in technology, there is little need to structure the organisation so that it can issue 
equity.  In this case, a CIC can be an appropriate form, although an IPS or Charitable 
Incorporated Organisation may also be appropriate.  Small-scale service organisations with 
low investment needs can be well served by common ownership forms (and can still, if not a 
charity, introduce profit-sharing arrangements).  It may even foster an egalitarian culture 
conducive to effective small team working.  In this study, such organisations were able to 
meet investment needs from their own revenue streams (cases F and G). 
Conclusions 
The conclusions of this study suggest a course of action for staff controlled (worker) 
co-operatives.  In addition, while the findings were not derived from voluntary organisations, 
charities or consumer co-operatives, the research indicates that staff participation combined 
with profit-sharing could provide benefits to a wider range of multi-stakeholder social 
enterprises.  A worker co-operative with growth ambitions is better served by structuring itself 
as an employee-owned enterprise with rules that combine majority collective and minority 
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individual equity ownership, rather than a common ownership co-operative based on either 
an IPS or CLG model.  It helps if equity is allowed to vary in line with the fortunes of the 
company.  While there is evidence that external equity is not necessary for rapid growth, it 
can play an important role in weathering a downturn in trade, assisting business 
development and expansion.  It can also be a tool for cementing joint ventures with suppliers 
and customers.   
One question that remains is whether a combined EBT/ESOP can sustain democratic 
organisation comparable to a common ownership co-operative.  The evidence from this 
study is encouraging, with combined systems of collective and individual ownership ensuring 
overall control is not lost to outside interests.  One-member, one-vote principles (at least at 
the level of the staff meeting) were in evidence and motivation levels may even be enhanced.  
Elected worker-directors were evident (and encouraged) in all the organisations that were 
equity based, but not in all common ownerships (see case J).  Nevertheless, external 
financial pressures did trigger the break up of one organisation attempting change (case D) 
and another attempt failed to achieve sustainability after problems negotiating with a venture 
capital fund (case H1).  Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that long-standing examples 
(such as John Lewis and Arup) use 100% collective ownership successfully, and that the 
consumer co-operative based on an IPS continues to develop and invest without the 
problems reported in this paper. 
Asset locks, in most but not all cases, came to be regarded as a problem.  Frequently, this 
understanding only developed in the wake of internal/external pressures for growth.  This 
being the case, the CIC form – even in its CLS guise – may not be the optimum choice for 
staff-controlled social enterprises because it denies capital growth to the parties that create 
value.  Both forms of CIC are designed to be redistributive, not distributive, and this weakens 
the case for it where staff are responding to their own disadvantages or low pay.  The CIC – 
like the pre-1997 IPS model deployed in ICOM worker co-operatives – may come to be seen 
as exploitative by shifting surpluses into indivisible capital reserves without adequately 
compensating entrepreneurial labour or making financial capital amenable to effective 
democratic control.  Viable alternatives like the Spanish coops (Whyte and Whyte, 1991; 
Holmstrom, 1993), trade-union led ESOPs (Spear, 1999) or investor-led ESOPs (Erdal, 
2008) merit active consideration. 
The consumer co-operative model discovered in follow up research was unexpected, and 
offers a clear attraction.  The surplus sharing arrangements reported in annual accounts 
stated that approximately 15% of profits were shared amongst employees, with dividends 
paid to members (i.e. the co-operative’s customers) and an equal amount deposited in a 
social economy investment fund.  This multi-stakeholder model is worthy of continued 
scrutiny as it offers a model for generating capital that can be invested in the social economy, 
whilst also attractive to workers and beneficiaries.  Moreover, it appears to be an excellent 
model for competing with (or reforming) utility companies.  
With regard to further research, there are three recommendations.  Firstly, follow up studies 
with a larger sample, and which interview a wider range of staff, would be able to confirm 
whether the decision-making processes described here represent a reasonable reflection of 
practice elsewhere.  Secondly, there appears to be a link between team-based decisions 
supported by experienced staff in a coaching (rather than managing) role and higher levels of 
staff participation and enterprise growth.  This is worth a separate study, particularly in the 
light of a substantive literature outlining the arguments for team-based structures with 
supportive ‘democratic’ managers (Johnson, 2006).  Social enterprises, because they are 
relatively free from external financial interests, may prove the place where these 
management practices find the most fertile ground.  
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Lastly, it is apparent that common ownership and employee ownership are fundamentally 
different – although they can be combined effectively to achieve a partial asset lock and 
strong performance through surplus sharing mechanisms.  Each give rise to different internal 
dynamics so a further comparative study, on a larger scale, would be able to account in more 
detail for differences in social and economic performance. 
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